Introduction

Brotherhood Cyberattack Against Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH: Nursery Data Exposed in Germany

On December 10, 2025, the German nursery Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH was hit by a cyberattack orchestrated by the Brotherhood ransomware group. This SME, specializing in perennials and shrubs and employing between 10 and 50 people, saw its customer data, seasonal orders, and logistics processes compromised. The incident, classified as SIGNAL level according to the XC classification, reveals the growing vulnerability of companies in the agricultural sector to cyber threats in Germany. This breach occurred during a critical period of order planning for the 2026 season, multiplying the operational impact on the organization.

Analyse détaillée

The attack against this family business illustrates a worrying trend: → malicious actors are now systematically targeting agricultural SMEs, considered vulnerable targets with often limited security systems. Data certified on the Polygon blockchain confirms the authenticity of this intrusion, allowing for complete traceability of the incident. For Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH, the consequences extend far beyond the IT realm: weakened business relationships, eroded customer trust, and threatened business continuity at a critical time.

#1. How Brotherhood Compromised Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH, Agriculture in Germany

On December 10, 2025, the cybercriminal collective Brotherhood claimed responsibility for compromising Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH, a German nursery specializing in the production and marketing of perennials and ornamental shrubs. This ransomware attack targeted a relatively small company (10 to 50 employees) but one that played a strategic role in the regional horticultural supply chain, highlighting the vulnerability of agricultural businesses to contemporary cyber threats.

The incident exposed critical information for the nursery's operations: customer databases containing contact information and purchase histories, seasonal order management systems essential for crop planning, and logistics processes detailing distribution channels. This breach occurs at a particularly sensitive time in the horticultural calendar, as industry professionals prepare their orders for the 2026 planting season.

Classified as SIGNAL according to the XC-Classify methodology, this incident signals an emerging threat requiring heightened vigilance, even though the extent of the leaked data remains limited at this stage. For an SME like Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH, the repercussions go beyond simple data loss: damage to its commercial reputation, disruption of relationships with partner garden centers and landscapers, and the risk of operational paralysis during a critical period.

This attack is part of a worrying trend observed in December 2025: → brotherhood intensifies its operations against European companies in the primary sector, methodically exploiting cybersecurity vulnerabilities in mid-sized organizations. German agriculture, despite its reputation for technological modernization, reveals structural weaknesses in the protection of its digital assets, particularly among family-run SMEs like this plant nursery.

2. Brotherhood: Modus Operandi, History, and Victims of the Ransomware Group

Brotherhood is a ransomware group active since 2024, specializing in targeted attacks against small and medium-sized European businesses, with a marked predilection for sectors traditionally less digitized, such as agriculture, crafts, and local services. This cybercriminal collective adopts a calculated opportunistic strategy, favoring organizations with limited security systems but generating sufficient revenue to consider paying a ransom.

Brotherhood's modus operandi relies on a now-classic double extortion model: encryption of the victim's computer systems to paralyze their operations, coupled with the prior exfiltration of sensitive data, the public disclosure of which is brandished as an additional threat. Attackers typically exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in remote access systems (VPNs, RDP) or targeted phishing campaigns aimed at employees with high privileges.

Analysis of Brotherhood's previous victims reveals a typical profile: companies with 10 to 200 employees, primarily located in Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, operating in sectors with low cybersecurity maturity. The group deliberately avoids large corporations with robust security teams, preferring to maximize its effort-to-return ratio by targeting vulnerable but solvent organizations.

Unlike major ransomware groups such as LockBit or BlackCat, Brotherhood does not appear to operate according to a structured Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. Technical indicators suggest instead a small team of operators controlling the entire attack chain, from initial reconnaissance to ransom negotiation. This compact organization likely explains the selectivity of its targets and the moderate pace of its attacks.

Brotherhood communicates with its victims via a showcase website on the dark web, where the data of companies refusing to negotiate is published. The group maintains a discreet but constant presence, avoiding dramatic demands while applying sufficient psychological pressure to induce payment. The ransom amounts demanded, although not made public, appear to be calibrated according to each victim's estimated revenue, generally ranging from a few thousand to several tens of thousands of euros.

3. Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH: Company Profile - Agriculture (10-50 employees) - Germany

Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH embodies the classic model of the specialized German family nursery, combining traditional horticultural expertise with modern marketing of perennials and ornamental shrubs. Based in Germany, this modestly sized company (estimated workforce of 10 to 50 employees) primarily serves a professional clientele: garden centers, landscapers, local authorities, and landscaping companies.

The core business of this nursery is the seasonal production of plants, an activity governed by strict natural cycles that necessitate rigorous planning. Orders are generally placed from autumn to spring, with critical peaks in activity during planting season. This pronounced seasonality makes the company particularly vulnerable to operational disruptions: a computer system failure in December 2025, a key period for preparing spring orders, could jeopardize a significant portion of annual revenue.

The digital infrastructure of Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH, typical of German agricultural SMEs, likely combines a business management system for tracking orders and inventory, a customer database developed over years of partnerships, and logistics tools coordinating production, storage, and deliveries. These systems, often developed incrementally without a comprehensive cybersecurity vision, are prime targets for malicious actors.

In the German horticultural landscape, this nursery occupies a specialized niche, valuing botanical expertise and the quality of its plants. Its reputation rests on the reliability of its supplies and the trust it has established with its business partners. The compromise of its customer data and operational processes directly threatens this relational capital, which is particularly sensitive in a sector where business relationships are built over the long term.

The impact of this cyberattack extends beyond the purely IT realm for Häussermann Stauden Gehölze GmbH. Beyond the technical recovery of its systems, the company must manage crisis communication with its professional clients, who may be concerned about the confidentiality of their purchasing data and sourcing strategies. For an organization of this size, the financial and human resources available for post-incident management remain limited, complicating organizational resilience.

Conclusion

4. Technical Analysis: Level of Exposure